Enlarging the Ivan Gren Class

TASS agency reported on February 17, 2021, that the latest vessels of Project 11711 Ivan Gren Class landing vessels will have a significant increase in displacement and carrying capacity. According to TASS agency, the vessels Vladimir Andreyev and Vasily Trushin will have a 40% increase in displacement which results in an increase of 100% in amphibious lift capacity for wheeled vehicles. The increase in both displacement and amphibious lift is achieved by increasing the dimensions, length and beam, of the vessels. Standard displacement is reported at 6.000 tons but the enlarged versions will thus have a displacement of around 8.400 tons. The machinery and power plant will be redesigned in order to cope with the additional weight. According to TASS, the new propulsion system will slightly increase the speed suggesting that these vessels will be faster then the 18 knots for the original vessels.

As stated earlier, the amphibious lift capacity is increased with 100% though this is specifically for wheeled vehicles. Depending on the source, the Ivan Gren class is designed to carry around 36 BTR armored personnel carriers which corresponds to a motorized battalion of around 300 soldiers. The enlarged version of the Ivan Gren class should thus be able to carry 72 BTRs or roughly the size of two battalions. However, no specifications were given regarding the carrying capacity of embarked soldiers and it seems unlikely that living quarters for embarked troops are increased correspondingly. It is therefore more likely that these vessels will normally carry one battalion for long durations and two battalions for short deployments, allowing the additional 300 soldiers to live on the vehicle storage and cargo decks. Another option is to carry a singe motorized battalion with 36 BTR-type vehicles and use the additional storage space either for supplies or logistical and engineering vehicles. This would result in amphibious forces being longer self sustainable once landed and be able to push deeper into hostile territory without the need for outside logistical and engineering support.

No direct reason for the enlargement of the Ivan Gren class was provided in the TASS news article. Either Russia is running behind in building enough amphibious landing vessels to replace the aging Tapir and Ropucha class landing ships, or Russia is in need of large vessels to support long term deployments of self-sufficient battalions abroad. Given the current state of affairs in the Russian Navy and the fact that Russia tends to use proxies such as private military companies in most conflicts abroad, the former reason seems the most plausible.

A few large Ivan Gren class landing ships are able to replace the several Ropucha class in service in the near future. Russia would thus be able to retain its current amphibious lift capacity in the near future without the need to match every retired Ropucha class vessel on a one-to-one basis. Large Ivan Gren class landing ships would also cut down on the total amount of personnel needed to operate and maintain this amphibious lift as fewer vessels are needed which decreases the economic burden of these vessels on the Russian defense budget. The amount of spare parts needed would also decrease and together with the fact that new vessels are less likely to break down in the first years, the economic burden is decreased even further. This is a very important point to take into consideration given the limited size of the Russian economy.

Source: Southfront.org

In conclusion we can state that the enlarged subclass of the Ivan Gren class is a natural development based on the current state of affairs in the Russian Navy. The Ropucha and Tapir class vessels are expected to be withdrawn in the near future due to their age. Replacing then will be the vessels of the Ivan Gren class, the original version already able to carry three times the amount of BTR-type vehicles of a single Ropucha class though without an increase in the amount of troops embarked. The enlarged version of the Ivan Gren class could carry up to 72 BTR-type vehicles but this will be most likely for short duration as the vessel can only accommodate the embarkation of a single battalion, meaning that the second embarked battalion will have to live and sleep on the vehicle and cargo decks during transit.

The enlarged version does open the possibility to embark self sufficient battalion tactical groups (BTG) and deploy them for a longer duration then currently is possible. The additional amphibious lift could be used for logistic and engineering vehicles, as well as additional supplies. These BTGs are thus be able to operate independently for a longer duration without outside support. This would make the enlarged Ivan Gren class able to operate either in far away regions such as the Pacific and Indian Oceans or in the isolated regions of the Artic.

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