The Russian Navy and the fall of Tartus

With the fall of the Al-Assad regime in Syria, the Syrian rebels allegedly gave Russia 48 hours to vacate their military presence in the naval base at Tartus and the Khmeimim airbase. It seems unlikely that Russia can broker a diplomatic deal to remain present in Tartus. It is expected that Russia will have to vacate its naval presence somewhere at the beginning of week 50.

As such, the Russian Navy will now have to look what options, if any, it has to maintain some sort of maritime presence in the Mediterranean.

Why Tartus mattered

The geographic location of Tartus made it an important strategic position for Russia. Located at the very end of the Eastern Mediterranean it was in a region where NATO/western maritime presence was limited compared to the Western and Central parts of the Mediterranean. The closest maritime base of importance for NATO is located at Souda Bay, Crete, which is located at the transition from Central to Eastern Mediterranean.

Operating from Tartus meant that Russia was able to project maritime power in the Mediterranean from a location where NATO normally has a minimal presence to interfere in Russia's operations. Though this doesn't mean that NATO had no means to interfere should such a situation be needed. Maritime patrol aircraft operating from Crete often kept track on Russian naval movements in the Eastern Mediterranean and coastal operations near the Syrian and Lebanese coast.

What Tartus meant for Russia was the ability to project maritime power and political influence relatively uncontested in the Middle East and allowed to punch above its weight. Although the Russian presence in the Mediterranean was very limited, often centered on two diesel-electric submarines, two frigates and two corvettes, it was able to draw in stronger maritime forces and sustain them for months on end by using the naval installations located in Tartus. 

The close proximity to the Suez Canal meant that Russia was able to pose a threat to western civilian shipping passing through the region as well as shifting forces to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean to cooperate with Sudan and Iran. At the same time Russian warships were able to provide an escort to Russian ships transporting fuel and military equipment between Russia and Syria, a convoy system generally known as the "Syrian Express". Frigates and corvettes would escort these vessels between Tartus and the Turkish Straits, preventing western powers from interfering, inspecting or boarding these vessels as they passed through the Aegean Sea.

During times of crisis, the Russians were able to use Tartus as the staging point for larger fleet units. This was most notable during the first months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine when Russia operated two Surface Action Groups around Crete. Each SAG was centered on a Slava class cruiser, a Udaloy class destroyer and a frigate. These deployments were more political in nature and served as a message to Western and Russian audiences to demonstrate that Russia would be able to interdict maritime support for Ukraine if need be.

Russia also made sure to always have warships stationed in Tartus that were equipped with Kalibr and Tsirkon cruise missiles. These vessels served as another threat/warning to NATO as they allowed to strike NATO bases and centers located around the Mediterranean. 

Even though the task force was relatively small and had limited combat capacities, the location of Tartus and the weapons employed on the warships allowed Russia to deploy a small though credible threat in the Mediterranean.

Possible regional alternatives to Tartus

With the Russians no longer able to operate from Tartus they are faced with two choices, either find an alternative for Tartus or being unable to maintain a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. In theory several options are available such as Eqypt, Algeria, Sudan and Libya. Non of these options provide the full range of advantages that Tartus offered.

Algeria

In the case of Algeria, most people are pointing out that the Russians regularly dock at Algiers, have good relations with the country and that Algeria is an active buyer of Russian weapon systems. Such analysis fail to take other factors in account. First, Algeria is pursuing a largely anti-colonial policy rather then a anti-western policy though some overlap exists. Algeria has a neutral stance and while it allows Russian warships to dock in Algiers, these port visits are nothing more then a short resupply and refueling stop for vessels just coming in or planning to go out of the Mediterranean.

Granting the Russians a naval base would mean a shift in Algerian policy of a more neutral stance to a pro-Russian stance. Even if Algeria was planning to give the Russians a naval base, the location is not suitable for Russia. The Western Mediterranean is a NATO maritime stronghold and naval movements by the Russians could be better monitored then was the case of Tartus. It also places Russia further away from it's main area of interests, the Middle East.

Egypt

Egypt could offer the Russians a position in the Eastern Mediterranean, close to the Suez Canal and port facilities from which to sustain a permanent presence. Egypt has a neutral policy trying to balance between Russia and the West. However, in the past years, Egypt has been shifting closer to the West with military arms purchases from European shipyards and F-16s provided by the United States. Allowing for a Russian presence in Egypt would alienate it from the West and jeopardize future military purchases as well as support for current western systems.

Sudan

Over the past years, Russia has been developing ties with Sudan leading to an agreement for a Russian naval base at Port Sudan. Also here, several issues will limit any Russian deployment.

Port Sudan would place the Russian Navy in the Red Sea, thus out of the Mediterranean. Though the close proximity of the Suez Canal would allow to dispatch vessels into the Eastern Mediterranean, the operational freedom would be limited as the Suez Canal serves as a chokepoint and early warning of Russian deployments.
Port Sudan in its current form is unable to support a naval task force and major dredging and construction efforts would be needed in order to create a suitable naval base, an operation that would take years. 

Last but not least, the active civil war in Sudan places a risk on any Russian plans for a naval base in Port Sudan. Should the anti-Russian faction win the Sudanese Civil War, the agreement to station Russian warships in Port Sudan would be revoked.

Tobruk - the least bad option

All things considered, the port of Tobruk, Libya, would offer the least bad option for the Russians if they want to maintain a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. 

First, the port of Tobruk allows for existing port facilities that could support a naval presence. Though less developed as the naval base in Tartus, a limited presence could be sustained. Fleet oilers and Amur class repair vessels could keep a task force operational over a long duration, just as was the case in Tartus. The nearby airfield at Adam, south of Tobruk, could allow for aerial logistics as well as the deployment of naval aviation aircraft though desert conditions would place an additional burden on maintenance and combat readiness.

Secondly, the location has some benefits. Located south of Crete and closer to the Central Mediterranean would result in easier surveillance by NATO forces, the location would still allow Russia to project power towards Crete and the Suez Canal, its main geopolitical targets in this region. Operating from Tobruk also brings Russian warships closer to Europe, thus expanding the area that can be struck with Kalibr cruise missiles.

Thirdly, the existing fuel infrastructure could aid the Russian task force. Just as with Banayas, Syria, the Russians could use their civilian tankers to transport crude oil out of Libya and bring in refined fuel, most likely aviation fuel, to support its operations.

And last, the Haftar regime in eastern Libya is already depended on Russian forces. Russian private military companies already operate in eastern Libya and were recently reinforced with military equipment coming from Syria, a so called Libyan Express run of at least 4 transports took place during 2024. Libya already serves as an important transit point for Russian aircraft heading to and from Africa.
Russian strength in eastern Libya is already at a point where troops belonging to Haftar would allegedly need permission to access airfields operated by Russian units [1].
Just as in Syria, the political situation in Libya is fragmented and the possibility that the civil war erupts again is never far off in the political calculations. By granting the Russians a naval base in Tobruk, Haftar could further strengthen his connections to Russia. Just how much this connection would result in military aid if the civil war restarts would remain to be seen. With Russia currently focused on the war in Ukraine, it has few if any resources it can spare to expand the naval installations at Tobruk and provide sufficient support for the Haftar in times of crisis.

Conclusion

The Russian navy has few if any options available in order to maintain a permanent maritime presence in the Mediterranean now that it is forced to leave Tartus. Realistically, only Tobruk would offer a viable alternative to Tartus though Russia would need to work with less support infrastructure then what it enjoyed in Tartus. However, unlike in Syria, Russia operates completely alone in eastern Libya with only Haftar's forces as an ally. Unlike Syria there are no other proxy forces available in Libya that support Haftar. There is no equivalent to Hezbollah and IRGC forces, meaning that only Russian PMC forces are there to bolster the Haftar regime. 
It is unknown if Russia is already negotiating with the Haftar regime and in what manner Haftar is willing to agree knowing that Russian forces will at this point, most likely not be able to aid his regime during a military crisis.