Russian Navy - News and Analysis

March 17, 2022 At least six Russian warships were observed near Odessa. The warships maintained their distance and operated on the horizon. March 16, 2022 Several vessels entered the port of Sevastopol including the patrol vessel Vasily Bykov. The Bykov was rumored to be struck and sunk by a Ukrainian grad MLRS barrage near Odessa on March 07 dough this was never officially confirmed.  The visual confirmation of the vessel entering the port of Sevastopol undamaged indicates that if an MLRS attack took place, it did not struck the Bykov. Ropucha class landing vessel Kondopoga of the northern fleet allegedly also entered the port of Sevastopol. March 15, 2022 Several Russian warships and landing ships were spotted on commercial satellite imagery during the morning hours. The vessels were heading in the direction of Odessa.  The vessel leading the formation of landing ships appears to be minesweeper with her sweeping array deployed. During the evening, around 90 missiles were rep...

Between October 16th and 19th, 2020, the Caspian Flotilla was involved in a combat readiness check which involved four of its main surface combatants. In total, six surface vessels, seven aircraft and a total of 400 servicemen were involved in this combat readiness check. [ 1 ] The four surface warships were identified as the two Gepard class frigates RFS Dagestan and  RFS Tartarstan, and the Buyan-M class corvettes RFS Uglich and RFS Veliky Ustyug. [ 2 ] [ 3 ] An additional two support ships sailed out and escorted the surface task force. These support ships provided emergency rescue services and logistical support if needed. The names of these two warships were not reported by Russian sources. TASS agency reported that all four warships were capable of launching Kalibr cruise missiles. It should be pointed out that only the RFS Dagestan was modified to carry Kalibr cruise missiles instead of the original eight KH-35 anti-ship cruise missiles. [ 4 ] The remaining three vessel...

Over the past years there have been sporadic and mostly symbolic deployments of Russian surface warships in the North Sea. These deployments project a limited amount of military power into a NATO controlled environment and thus pose a limited military threat to its alliance members. Instead, these deployments rather serve a symbolic purpose, as to remind NATO and the world that Russia has the capabilities to project power into the North Sea and into Europe. These deployments first serve to maintain a certain status quo and a balance against NATO deployments in the Baltic Sea where Russia seeks to maintain a position of strength. They also serve a certain propaganda purpose as these deployments are often noticed by and mentioned in Western news bulletins who usually give the appearance that NATO forces were captured by surprise and are thus vulnerable. For NATO however, these sporadic Russian deployments in the North Sea can serve as an opportunity to counter Russia's influence eith...

Udaloy class destroyers, together with the Slava and Kirov class cruisers and the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, form the blue water navy component of the Russian Navy. Their large displacement makes them more suitable to operate in the rougher conditions of the words oceans than frigates and corvettes. While the Admiral Gorshkov class frigates have demonstrated their capabilities of operating on the high seas, most notably during the circumnavigation by the lead ship, the RFS Admiral Gorshkov, the larger tonnage of the Udaloy class means that destroyers are more stable platforms. The modernization of the Russian surface fleet is characterized by two different types of programs. On the one side their is the massive build up of corvettes and frigates to replace the aging vessels in use by the Russian Navy. On the other side there is the modernization of larger surface combatants such as the Slave class cruisers, the Kirov class nuclear cruiser RFS Admiral Nakhimov, the aircraft car...

Between August 03 and August 12, the Russian Baltic Fleet held its annual Ocean Shield exercise in the Baltic Sea. While smaller compared to last years exercise with only 30 warships participating, this years exercise was more imported because it was build on an offensive scenario, rather then a defensive one during 2019. While the opposing forces of the 2019 exercise were identified as NATO forces, the opposing force of the 2020 was less easy to identify. The offensive nature and swift sea control gained by the Russian Navy could suggest an surprise attack against NATO when few NATO forces are present, or the attack against a neutral country with significant maritime forces, most likely Sweden. Just like last year, the exercise could be monitored through the use of open source material but unlike 2019 there was less available. Especially the Russian open sources such as state media and main newspapers were less vocal about the progress of Ocean Shield 2020. The third part of the exerc...