A Russian logistic support base in Sudan?

On November 11, Interfax reported that a draft proposal was worked out between Russia and Sudan for creating a logistic support base at Port Sudan. Though both countries have yet to make an official decision on this mater, talks about a Russian naval base, or at least a support base, have been ongoing since 2017. Should this logistic support base become a reality, Russia would be able to support a permanent naval presence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and possibly project power into the Indian Ocean as well.

The details that are currently available speak of a logistic support base where Russian warships can be resupplied and undergo minor repairs. A maximum of four vessels are allowed to dock in this base at any given time and the maximum number of servicemen inside the base is set at 300. Sudan must be warned 12 hours in advance when a Russian vessel is due to arrive in the support base. This time is reduced to a minimum of six hours in the case of operation needs. Another important aspect is that the draft proposal mentions the opportunity to deploy nuclear powered vessels. It is also unclear if this logistical supply base will be set up at the commercial harbor or at the small Sudanese naval base to the north of the city. The agreement which is currently in the draft proposal will last for 25 years. Russia will allegedly provide free air defenses for the Sudanese naval base north of Port Sudan.

As for security, Sudan will be responsible for securing the exterior of the logistic support base but Russia will allegedly also be allowed to set up temporary military posts in Sudan to guard its support base. Russia will be also responsible for protecting the base from the seaside, provide air defense and maintain internal security inside the base. With Russia being responsible for the air defense of the support base, it seems that the free delivery of air defenses is taken out of context. Rather, Russia will deploy air defense systems that protects it support base and that this protection is also extended to the Sudanese naval base north of Port Sudan.

Sudanese naval base north of Port Sudan

The new logistic supply base would be located halfway the Red Sea, allowing the Russian Navy to maintain a presence in both this area and in the Gulf of Aden. This region houses one of the most busiest maritime trade routes as it connects European and Asiatic markets and is the main route for energy supplies towards European countries. In recent years, several nations have expanded or even started their maritime presence in this region. Most notably would be China and Japan who both have a maritime base at Djibouti, a location situated at the strategic Strait of Bab el Madeb.

While Djibouti is a more strategic location due to its close proximity to the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, Port Sudan is relatively close by to allow for fast deployments into the Gulf of Aden.

Indian Ocean trade routes converge in the Golf of Aden and Bab el Mandeb

As for the type of deployments the Russian Navy could undertake from the logistic support base in Sudan, a lot remains open to speculations and will depend the final draft of the agreement. Needless to say, the support base a Port Sudan could function in the same manner as the Russian naval base at Tartus, Syria, functions but to a lesser scale. Tartus allows Russia to keep a small surface action group permanent deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Most surface warships rotate in and out of the Mediterranean and have small replenishment stops in Tartus. The improved Kilo class submarines however tend to stay in Tartus for longer periods between deployments at sea.

A similar routine could exist for the Port Sudan base with warships entering and leaving for resupply and necessary repairs but without prolonged stays. The fact that only four warships are to stay in Port Sudan at any given time is a limitation on the total force Russia could sustain in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden but with proper planning and rotation Russia could sustain a force of six to eight vessels from Port Sudan as not every ship needs to be repaired and supplied on the same time.

More important will be the type of warships deployed from Port Sudan. Most speculation is about how Port Sudan could sustain Russia's anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. The lack of a supply base in this region forced Russia in the past to deploy large warships which have a inherent longer duration at sea compared to smaller vessels. It is noted that these larger warships such as destroyers and frigates were punching above their weight and that smaller vessels such as for example the Project 22160 class patrol ships of the Vasily Bykov class are better suited. These vessels are equipped with a helicopter hangar and deck, carry a landing speedboat, and has provisions for drones, underwater unmanned craft and unmanned boats. When it comes to anti-piracy operations, these vessels can de the task equally as well as larger frigates and destroyers. The downside is the small endurance time of the Vasily Bykov class compared to these larger warships. Having Port Sudan nearby for resupply makes deploying a Vasily Bykov class vessel in the Gulf of Aden more sustainable.

Special attention is to be given to the phrase that nuclear powered vessels can dock in Port Sudan. Should Sudan agree to this, then the Kirov class battle cruisers and nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy could, in theory, dock at and deploy from Port Sudan. Using Port Sudan in order to supply and sustain the deployment of nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean would however be just a symbolic showing the flag without real power projection. Without the capabilities of conducting major repairs, these submarines still rely on their main bases for maintenance after extended periods at sea. The long transit time towards Port Sudan, compared with several geographic choke points that need to be crossed in order to get there, limits the combat capabilities and hence the threat level of these submarines.

While these submarines could in theory pose a threat to US naval task forces operating in the Indian Ocean, in the event of a real conflict, these vessels are cut off from outside supply and hunted down by overwhelming naval forces. One only needs to examine the fate of the Italian Red Sea Flotilla during the opening years of the Second World War to understand that an isolated base inside the Red Sea is vulnerable against a maritime power that con blockade the Strait of Bab el Mandeb and the Suez Canal.

In conclusion, should Russia be able to set up a logistic support base at Port Sudan, it can maintain a presence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in the same manner as Russian warships operating from Tartus in the Eastern Mediterranean do. Especially in the case of anti-piracy operations, a logistic center offers the possibility of deploying smaller warships with less endurance at sea, thus freeing up the larger warships for other operations elsewhere.

The possibility of allowing ships with nuclear propulsion to enter the port could in theory open the door for deploying nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. However, geographically cut of from their main bases and with insufficient numbers, these submarines would do little but showing the flag during peace time.