Turning the Pacific Fleet towards the Arctic

On August 27, the Russian Pacific Fleet kicked off a large scale naval exercise in the Bering Strait, separating Russia from Alaska. The exercise, which involved over 15 warships, saw the deployment of the Pacific Fleet's flagship, the Slava class missile cruiser RFS Varyag, and the Oscar II class SSGN RFS Omsk. Other capital ships involved Udaloy class destroyers and Steregushchy class frigates. The exercise area was reported to be at the southern entrance of the Bering Strait.

The most notable event during this exercise was the launch of anti-ship cruise missiles against simulated targets during an anti-surface warfare exercise. The RFS Varyag launched one of her P-1000 Vulcan anti-ship cruise missiles while the submarine RFS Omsk launched a P-700 Granit missile from a submerged position. Both ships reportedly struck their simulated targets, located at a distance of respectively 450 and 320 kilometres away.

RFS Varyag launching a P-1000 Vulcan AShCM

What makes this exercise relevant is the specific location in which it was held, the southern entrance of the Bering Strait which connects the Pacific Ocean with the Arctic Region. The Pacific Fleet specifically trained its capabilities in anti-access and area denial capabilities which seeks to either completely block the passage of hostile warships in a specific zone, or limit their freedom of maneuverability while inflicting a maximum of damage. 

It is no secret that Russia seeks to have military dominance in the Arctic Region. Already the Northern Fleet controls the entrance to this region from the Atlantic side and additional bases are build in Northern Russia which could be used to project more military power into the region. Developing the capabilities to restrict or block access to the Arctic Region from the Pacific Ocean is considered the next stepping stone. By controlling the passage through the Bering Strait and the Barents Sea, the only route available which Russia does not control would be the northwestern passage which runs between Greenland and Canada. The many islands and thick ice makes passage through that area very difficult and slow of not completely impossible as seen from a military point of view.

Russian fleet positions compared to entrance to the Arctic region

Shifting the Pacific Fleet to support Russia's Arctic ambitions also makes sense from a larger geopolitical point of view. The rapid expansion and modernization of the Chinese People's Army Liberation Navy (PLAN) has changed the balance of power and triggered a naval build up in the Western Pacific. Aside from the naval build up of the PLAN, the US Navy plans to deploy more vessels into the western Pacific in order to counter the growing maritime threat posed by the PLAN. Medium sized countries such as Japan and South Korea are also expanding their navies at a rapid pace with both countries announcing that they too are building small aircraft carriers to counter the PLAN.

Russia is severely lagging behind in the Pacific. It is currently only starting to receive new surface warships and submarines but rather than to expand the Pacific Fleet, these vessels will replace already existing older vessels. While the Pacific Fleet will become more powerful in the coming years through the influx of modern ship with new weapon systems and sensors, there will be no growth in the amount of vessels which will lead in Russia falling further behind compared to the other nations in the Pacific.

On the other hand, with other naval powers focused to counter China within the first and second island chains, the balance of power within the Northern Pacific Region receives little attention. Russia could in theory exploit this situation by shifting the Pacific Fleet to support its ambitions in the Arctic Region, especially as the US Navy is focused on countering China and does not develop the capabilities and experience to operate in the Arctic Region.

Practical restrictions remain however that limit the use of the Pacific Fleet in the Arctic Region. The first one is distance. Unlike the Northern Fleet, the Pacific Fleet is not located directly at the entrance of the Bering Strait as its main naval base is Vladivostok. The submarine base in Kamchatka is closer to the Bering Strait but the nuclear submarines stationed here will also have to operate deeper in the Pacific Ocean while the ballistic missile submarines will most likely be deployed close to the Sea of Okhotsk, which is their main bastion. Denying the use of the Bering Strait would mean that the Pacific Fleet would have to sail out of Vladivostok in force, a deployment that can easily be detected and tracked and which gives time for other nations to prepare themselves against the arrival of the Pacific Fleet or even create the possibilities to intercept it during transit.

The second restriction is the size of the Pacific Ocean. The Pacific Fleet has several tasks that dilute its strength. It must be able to secure a free passage in the Sea of Japan and maintain the bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk. Nuclear submarines, as mentioned above, also need to operate deeper in the Pacific Ocean in order to create a defense in depth. Sending warships to the Bering Strait to restrict the passage of enemy warships means weakening the balance of power in the Sea of Japan which is already unfavorable as both Japan and South Korea expand their navies.

In conclusion, a true shift of the Pacific Fleet towards the Arctic Region is unlikely without maintaining some balance in the Sea of Japan. At the same time, Russia can rely on China to keep both the South Korean, Japanese and US navies occupied while it operates in the Northern Pacific Region instead of competing for power in the western Pacific Region. Should the Pacific Fleet indeed shift to the Arctic Region we expect to see more Pacific Fleet task forces deploying and exercising in the Bering Strait. At the same time, Russia could also expand its military infrastructure in the this area by constructing more runways for naval aviation and bases from which coastal missile batteries can deploy from.

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