Russia's capital shipbuilding restrictions

Whenever the Russian media shows scale models of potential aircraft carriers for the Russian Navy, a widespread debate starts about the use and purpose of these vessels by the Russian Navy. While these discussions have their rightful place, there is a general ignorance that the aircraft carrier debate is part of a larger discussion, namely that Russia has always been lagging in the construction and operation of capital ships. One simply has to look to the fact that Russian shipyards are currently not building larger vessels such as destroyers and cruisers. Indeed, all capital ships currently in use by the Russian Navy date back from the Soviet era and it is unlikely that the lack in capital ships will be resolved in the near future.

Lamantin class carrier - scale model

Historical perspective
The lack of capital warships in the Russian navy can be traced back to the end of the tsarists empire. Having lost the majority of its capital ships first in the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 and then during the civil war following the communist revolution, the Soviet navy found itself with few capital ships. As a dominant land power, the Soviet Navy was expected to play a secondary role in defending the Soviet coast and supporting army operations in the littoral zone. Subsequently, the Soviet navy was first influenced by the so called "Young School" of maritime warfare which advocated for a navy of small warships such as destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines, coastal artillery and land based aviation. Little emphasis was given to capital shipbuilding such as cruisers, battleships and aircraft carriers.

There were notable efforts to construct capital ships in later years, first by Stalin who wanted to create an ocean going fleet at the start of World War Two, followed by a second attempt at the end of his reign. Later on, under Admiral Gorshkov, the Soviet Navy constructed capital ships to supplement its navy but only after smaller warships were constructed first and when the need for projecting naval power on a global scale became important.

Vessels such as the Kirov class battlecruisers and Slava class cruisers only appeared in the 1980s and they were intended to be the flagships of surface action groups (SAG) designed to attack and destroy US carrier action groups (CAG). It was however expected that these SAGs would operate at the edge of the so called bastion areas where they could be supported by land based aviation and coastal missile systems.

Kirov class battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with a large fleet which it could not support financially. The economic realities forced Russia to decommission several capital ships. At the same time, shipyards received less orders to construct ships and several engineers moved abroad. This loss in expertise makes it difficult for Russia to start constructing capital ships. This explains in part why the Mistral deal with France included a transfer of shipbuilding technology to Russia.

Small ships in Russia's maritime doctrine
Over the past years, Russia has successfully constructed new and modern warships and introduced new weapon systems on board of its ships. The general evolution however is that Russia is focused on the construction of smaller warships such as corvettes and frigates. Indeed, no new construction of ships larger then a destroyer is currently underway in Russia with the exception of two LHD vessels. All the other capital ships currently in use are modernized vessels from the Soviet Navy.

It appears that Russia again follows the concepts of the young school in maritime warfare with a navy more suited for coastal defense and operations in the near seas. There is some true in this claim but it is fairly short sighted. The Russian Navy currently falls back on its first task, namely protecting the Russian coast against a possible invader. Corvettes and frigates are best suited for operation in the littorals and have the benefit of being relative cheap, allowing the Russians to build a large number of them and modernize the majority of their naval forces. At the same time, it gives Russian shipyards experience in the construction of warships which can be used later in building capital ships.

Tsirkon hypersonic missile - expected to be equipped on Russian frigates

A special attention needs to be given to the frigates. They are capable of operating in the near seas and on the oceans, allowing them to be tools for power projection. At the same time, they are armed with new missile systems such as Kalibr and in the future Tsirkon missiles. These missiles use their high speed to penetrate the defensive barriers of as hostile SAG and CAG. Although this concept is not been tested in reality, Russia believes that the Kalibr, and later Tsirkon, missiles will give them an advantage in a potential naval conflict. Simultaneously, as more missiles are expected to penetrated hostile defenses and hit their targets, fewer are needed in a salvo to ensure the destruction of an enemy vessel. As such, Russian frigates are expected to be able to punch above their weight, even if they can fire only eight or 16 missiles. the long range of these missiles, coupled with evolution in detection and tracking by space based sensors, allow these ships to engage hostile ships from a large distance and stay out of the missile range of their targets.

A use for capital ships?
Russia currently lacks the shipbuilding capabilities to match the US Navy or Chinese Navy when it comes to capital ships. As a mater of fact, it has only a very limited amount of shipyards that can even build capital ships, let alone at a rate where parity with the US and China can be achieved. This brings us to the fundamental question, does Russia need capital ships? Surely, Russian naval engineers claim there is a need and they are eager to show their capabilities in designing such ships. Russia's latest scale model of a potential future aircraft carrier is proof of that. But are capital ships necessary for the Russian Navy?

Capital ships do have their place in Russia's maritime doctrine. Destroyers and cruisers can carry more missiles then frigates can, making them the center pieces of any future Russian SAG. With their advantage in hypersonic missiles and larger amount in vertical launch systems, capital ships such as destroyers and cruisers can form a potent naval deterrent. Capital also have a longer endurance, allowing them to project Russian power on a global scale. The voyage of the Slava class cruiser RFS Marshal Ustinov is a prime example of how a capital ship can be used as a tool for diplomacy. 

As for aircraft carriers, it is important to understand that Russia's views them in a different role then western naval analysts do. Russian carriers are small and their sky-jump limits the amount of missiles and bombs a carrier plane can take with it. They are thus less suited for supporting ground operations compared to the larger aircraft being launched from the CATOBAR carriers of the US and French navies. While Russia's sole aircraft carrier, the RFS Admiral Kuznetsov, did participate in air operations in Syria, its results were meager compared to US carrier strikes. Soviet and Russian carriers were more suited for providing air support to SAGs as they approached their targets, usually US carrier groups.

Future development
Russia currently stands at an important cross-road when it comes to its navy. It is nearing the end of the modernization of its smaller warships. Most of them will be replaced by newer corvettes and frigates in the coming years. At the same time, Russia is at a point where it can successfully defend its shores against a naval invader. From a defensive point of view, the Russian Navy is almost complete. But at the same time Russia is looking outwards and is once again expanding its influence on a global scale. Capital ships will be needed to support this power projection and form the more offensive capabilities of the Russian Navy. Russia also has the intention to transform its Naval Infantry into an expeditionary force and as such will need modern transport ships and their escorts.

Construction of capital ships in sufficient numbers will require large financial means both in modernizing and expanding current shipyards, as well as paying for the skilled labor needed in building warships. It is currently not clear if Russia will be able to pay for such an investment as current economic sanctions place limitations on the military budget. Priority seems to be in the development of modern weapons which allow Russia to maintain an edge over its rivals in the mid and lang term period. Draining money away from these projects to build expensive capital ships would currently be a bad option for the Russian armed forces. Indeed, equipping current capital ships with modern missile systems is a better solution but only in the short term as these vessels are nearing the end of their service life with first of them expected to start phasing out in the next five to ten years, depending on the quality of ship maintenance.

Scale model of a future Lider class destroyer

All things taken in consideration, it is for now expected that Russia continues to invest in the construction of frigates as a cheaper way of building up its naval power. New missile systems are expected to give these vessels a qualitative advantage over most western surface vessels. We can expect Russia to slowly start building larger frigates that carry more vertical launch systems, increasing the amount of cells to a standard of 16 to 24 missiles. A clear indication that Russia is taking capital shipbuilding more seriously will be when new destroyers are under construction as they are the smallest type of capital ships in service in the current navies. As for cruisers and carriers, the huge cost needed to construct these vessels are currently seen as being to expensive and a drain on other projects that are needed to give the Russian armed forces an advantage on the battlefield.

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