Ocean Shield 2019 - After action report
Exercise Ocean Shield 2019 (Okeanskiy Shchit 2019) was a large scale naval exercise conducted by the Baltic Fleet between August 1 and 9, 2019. The exercise involved the participation of over 49 warships from two seperate fleets, Northern and Baltic, with 20 support ships. Over 58 aircraft from both the army and naval aviation were involved as well. Russian figures state that a total of 10,634 military personnel were involved in the exercise.
The exercise involved a wide variety of smaller exercises which will be discussed in further detail below in the form of daily reports followed by a general summary. The first focus of the exercise was to check the combat readiness of the Russian naval forces in the Baltic Sea and the further development of skills in operating the fleet and executing different tasks during this exercise. Several Russian sources state that lessons learned from naval deployments at the Syrian coast were also taken into account during the exercise.
A lot of information regarding the exercise was available in various Russian media outlets, western Media and social media platforms. This amount of information allowed outsiders to keep track of the exercise on a daily basis. Though, even with the abundance of information available in open sources, it is impossible to compile a detailed list of every exercise and ship involved over these nine days. This after action report is composed of the information available through open sources and only includes the exercises on which the Russians decided to report.
August 1
On August 1 the Russian Navy launched Exercise Ocean Shield 2019 in the Baltic Fleet area of operation. The exercise, which would last until August 9, involved a total of 48 warships. This number is a significant increase from the previous exercise Ocean Shield 2018 which took place in the Mediterranean Sea and involved only 26 warships.
A task force of the Northern Fleet, which was previously present at the ceremony for the Russian Navy Day at Saint Petersburg on July 28, also participated in the exercise as it transited through the Baltic Sea. The task force was comprised of the missile cruiser RFS Marshal Ustinov, the destroyer RFS Severodvinsk, the frigate RFS Admiral Gorshkov, the missile submarine RFS Smolensk and their escorting logistical ships.
The presence of a Northern Fleet task force would be useful in order to increase cooperation between the Northern and Baltic Fleets and one could claim that Ocean Shield 2019 would provide the Northern Fleet with first hand experience and understanding of operating in the Baltic Sea. It was however later reported that the Northern Fleet task force left the Baltic Sea on August 3 and 4. This means that the task force was only transiting through the Baltic Sea and took the opportunity of conducting a small set of exercises but refrained from participating in the whole exercise. The time spent in the Baltic Sea is too short to gain any experience in how naval combat in the Baltic Sea is conducted.
Exercise Ocean Shield 2019 was not only a pure maritime exercise but also involved land based forces. Missile units in the Kaliningrad Region conducted an exercise with Bal and Bastion mobile anti-ship missiles. The exercise included the deployment of these missile systems from their barracks towards a designated firing position. Once in place, these systems then proceeded to simulate the launch their missiles against a group of enemy surface ships. The role of this enemy task force was played by a group of surface warships of the Baltic Fleet. The ships involved in this ‘enemy’ task force were not identified.
August 2
On August 2, several Project 20380 Steregushchy missile corvettes of the Baltic Fleet conducted an anti-submarine drill in the Baltic Sea. The ships involved were identified as the RFS Boikiy, RFS Steregushchiy and RFS Stoiky. The ships were aided in their maneuvers by four Il-38N maritime patrol aircraft of the Northern and Pacific Fleets.
Afterwards, the three corvettes proceeded to take part in a second series of exercises which were centered around joint maneuvering at sea, jamming radar systems, damage control exercises and protection against CBRN weapons.
At the same time, a simulated naval battle between two surface action groups (SAG) took place at the Baltic Sea. The first SAG consisted of the Nanuchka missile corvettes RFS Passat and RFS Liven. The second SAG was designated as the enemy task force and was composed of the Parchim class missile boat RFS Urengoy and the ships Morshansk and R-257. FS Passat and RFS Liven conducted a first missile strike against the enemy SAG. The enemy SAG was then tasked with conducting air-defense drills against the incoming missile strike and afterwards retaliated by launching their own weapons. The whole operation took place with both SAG jamming electronic systems in order to increase their protection against detection and targeting from the opposing forces.
The second day of Ocean Shield 2019 started out with three out of the four Baltic Fleet Project 20380 corvettes taking part in various exercises. As a general rule it is accepted that out of three warships, only one will be available for combat duties at any given time. The second and third ship are either in maintenance or in training or fitting out. With a total of four Steregushchy corvettes it was thus expected that two to three ships would be available for exercise Ocean Shield 2019. With three ships taking part in the exercises, the Baltic Fleet scores well when it comes to having its ships available for duty at sea.
The participation of maritime patrol aircraft in cooperation with surface warships is a common practice in anti-submarine warfare. Aircraft are able to scan large areas faster than surface vessels but are generally less accurate than ship based sensors. Aircraft can deliver the range while surface ships can deliver the precision needed to detect and track potential submarine contacts.
The fact that all four aircraft were drawn from the Northern and Pacific Fleets could indicate that the Baltic Fleet lacked the necessary aircraft needed for this exercise and had to draw upon resources from other fleets. The benefit, however, is that both the Northern and Pacific Fleets gained training and experience in how to operate in the Baltic Region and can now be considered as reserves and backup for the Baltic Fleet in case of a conflict.
August 3
The Oscar-class guided missile submarine RFS Smolensk left the Baltic Sea on August 3. The submarine was part of the Northern Fleet task force that was transiting from Saint Petersburg towards the Barents Sea. Also leaving the Baltic Sea on this day were the sea tug Nikolay Chiker and the logistical support vessel Elbrus. All ships were escorted out by the Danish Navy when the ships passed through Danish waters.
The early departure of the submarine, which past the Fehmarnbelt around 5am local time, suggests that the submarine and the escorting group did not participate much during exercise Ocean Shield 2019 and might have gone straight from Saint Petersburg towards Danish waters in order to leave the Baltic Sea.
It was also reported in German media outlets that Exercise Ocean Shield 2019 was under observation by Sweden and Finland. At the same time, the German Navy dispatched the reconnaissance ship Oste to the Baltic Sea in order to monitor the Russian exercise. The Oste is reported to be equipped with electronics for locating and monitoring radio and radar systems, allowing it to monitor the exercise from a distance. The Oste was last seen on AIS in the Gulf of Finland on July 29 before she turned off her AIS signal. The vessel presumably waited in the Gulf of Finlandto monitor the Russian warships leaving from Saint Petersburg. She was later photographed on August 5 when she was closely monitoring a formation of Russian warships.
Baltic Fleet naval infantry conducted land exercises at Kaliningrad at battalion level during the day. Over 500 military personnel and 50 military equipment were involved during the exercise. The exercise was reported as a combined arms exercise with a mechanized battalion facing a conventional enemy and involved life firing exercises.
Identified equipement of the exercise included BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 2S3 Akatsiya SPGs, 2K22 Tunguska anti-air defense systems and BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems. Air support for the battalion was provided by the Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation and included Su24 aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters.
In general, August 3 appears to have been a relatively quiet day for Ocean Shield 2019 and no naval exercises were reported through OSINT channels.
August 4
On August 4 the remaining surface vessels of the Northern Fleet left the Baltic Sea by passing under the Storebelt bridge around 1pm local time and entering the North Sea. The task force was comprised of the missile cruiser RFS Marshal Ustinov, the destroyer RFS Severomorsk and the frigate Admiral Gorshkov. Sea tug SB-406 was also part of this flotilla.
The rapid departure of the Northern Fleet task forces from Ocean Shield 2019 can be seen as a missed opportunity for training and gaining experience with the Baltic Fleet. However, from a larger strategic concept, participation of the Northern Fleet in a Baltic Sea exercise could also be deemed unnecessary in the eyes of the Russian high command due to different strategic tasks assigned to each fleet.
These different tasks come from the fact that the Baltic Fleet would always find itself in an isolated position in the case of an armed conflict in the Baltic Sea. NATO control over the Danish Straits make it virtually impossible for any outside Russian fleet to enter the Baltic Sea unopposed and undetected while at the same time, the Baltic Fleet will be unable to break out without risking its destruction by naval and ground forces operating in the Danish Straits. While Russia could gain a first advantage in a surprise attack in the form of outnumbering NATO forces and mining the Danish Straits, the eventual result will always be a continuous flow and build up of NATO forces who arrive through the Danish Straits.
The Northern Fleet will thus be unable to directly support the Baltic Fleet and on the strategic level, the support of the Northern Fleet would either occur in the form of indirect support by attacking Atlantic sea lanes of communications in order to delay and disrupt the arrival of US and NATO forces in the North Sea before they pass into the Baltic Sea.
Training Northern Fleet warships in the specific conditions of naval warfare in the Baltic Sea could thus be judged a waste of time and resources as these ships would never be expected to join the Baltic Fleet directly in a conflict scenario. The first task of the Northern Fleet will most likely involve blue water operations on the Atlantic Ocean while the Baltic Fleet is expected to perform green water naval tasks within the Baltic Sea.
August 5
August 5 has been reported as a very active day during Ocean Shield 2109 as at least 12 ships were reported to have been involved in the various exercises with another unspecified amount of ships providing support. The identified ships are reported to be the three Project 20380 Steregushchiy class corvettes RFS Boikiy, RFS Steregushchiy and RFS Stoiky, Neustrashimyy class frigate RFS Yaroslav Mudry, the missile boats Passat, Geizer, Serpukhov and Mytishchi as well as the missile boats Chuvashia and Morshansk. The two Ropucha class amphibious assault ships RFS Alexander Shabalin and RFS Kaliningrad were also involved.
The exercises started with a departure from the naval base towards preassigned training grounds. Minesweepers were used to check and clear the harbor entrance and the approaches in order to assure a safe passage of the ships towards their training grounds. Later during the day there was an anti-submarine warfare exercises where the ships simulated detecting and destroying a diesel-electric submarine, a role played by a Kilo class submarine. Gunnery and torpedo exercises were held later during the day, as well as simulated missile strikes. The two amphibious landing ships also practised an amphibious assault against an undefended coast.
The Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation Su-24 bombers and Su-30SM multipurpose fighters staged air-attacks against the naval task force. The attacking aircraft were escorted by Su-27 fighters. A total of ten aircraft were tasked to fly to an assigned region and conduct attacks against a simulated detachment of surface vessels. Reports were made that the ships performed air-defense drills during the day, which might suggest that the aircraft were sent out to perform realistic attacks upon the Baltic Fleet which in turn allowed the Baltic Fleet to conduct a realistic air defense exercise.
Compared to what was reported on previous days, August 5 appears to be a day where Ocean Shield 2019 expanded in scope. More diverse exercises were reported on this day and more ships were involved in these exercises compared to previous days. The exercises also evolved from the level of small task forces to the formation of a larger naval group, which also means an increase in the level of command and coordination. Pictures that were released during the day indeed show a large naval group where the individual ships maneuvered to take up assigned positions within a larger formation.
August 6
Nanuchka class missile boat RFS Passat conducted an anti-aircraft exercise against a simulated conventional enemy. The corvette was tasked to defend herself against an air attack with the use of her anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as the A-176 naval gun and 30-mm AK-630 close-in weapon systems. The attacking aircraft were Su-24 bombers of the Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation.
Small missile boats such as the Nanuchka class have a tactical advantage when operating in constrained maritime regions such as the Baltic Sea. Their small size reduces their radar cross section and allows them to stay close to shore where their radar signal can be masked in the radar clutter of the shoreline. Missile boats are thus able to strike from an ambush position against ships in open waters. Missile boats, however, also have several weaknesses. They are easily detectable from the air and thus vulnerable against fighter aircraft and helicopters. While missile boats can defend themselves, their small size limits the amount of weapons they can carry with them. These boats are thus best deployed in coastal waters near a naval base so that they can return and rearm once they run out of ammunition.
Logistics personnel of the Baltic Fleet conducted several logistical exercises in the Kaliningrad Region. The exercises ranged from supplying the Kaliningrad naval base, as well as the evacuation of battle damaged vehicles towards specialized maintenance and repair centers. Land units also practiced the construction of pontoon bridges over water obstacles. At sea, these exercises involved resupplying warship with new weapons and ammunition.
August 7
On August 7, Russian media reported that anaval group of three amphibious landing ships practiced air defence drills, followed by the landing of a naval infantry force. The three ships were identified as the Ropucha class landing ships RFS Korolyov, RFS Minsk and RFS Alexander Shabalin.
The first part of the exercise involved defending against aircraft. All three ships used active and passive jamming to avoid being detected and targeted. In a later stage, all three ships were tasked to defend against and repel an air attack by using their AK-176 and AK-725 guns systems.
Later during the day, all three ships practised an amphibious landing of an unidentified unit of Russian naval infantry. During the landing phase, the ships provided support by firing towards enemy positions at the coast with their artillery systems and Grad-M launchers. Even though the size of the naval infantry unit was not reported, a quick assessment of the loading capacity of the Ropucha class shows that three of these ships are capable of landing a battalion sized unit with their tanks and vehicles.
On land, a large anti-terrorism drill was held in the naval base of Kaliningrad. Units were tasked with the defense of repair and logistic facilities against a group of terrorists who approached from under water, in speedboats or over land. Over a thousand military personnel from the Baltic Fleet special forces, naval infantry and military police were involved in the exercise, supported by several aircraft from the Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation.
Most maritime exercises are focused on the pure maritime warfare aspect which also extends to amphibious operations. Ocean Shield 2019 expands this aspect with an exercise that involves terrorist using sea mobility in order to attack shore based installations.
Ocean Shield 2019 thus covers a wider aspect then only the pure maritime conflict. The geography of the Baltic Region, mean that any armed conflict will involve a complex coordination of naval and land based assets. The close proximity of ports mean that terrorists or commando’s could quickly mount hit and run attacks against shore and land installations in the Kaliningrad Region and undermine the sustainability of Russian armed forces in this region.
Also on this day, Russian media reported that over the past days there was a sharp increase of reconnaissance flights conducted by NATO aircraft at the Kaliningrad Region. In addition to a US air force Boeing RC-135U and RQ-4B-30 Global Hawk, a British Sentinel R.1 made two flights on August 6 and 7. Russian media reported that the British aircraft remained close to Kaliningrad but appeared to have been monitoring an unspecified situation at Belarusia, rather than the maritime deployment at Ocean Shield 2019.
At the same time, Danish patrol boats were sent out to monitor Russian warships operating near or even in Danish waters. German media reported that over 19 Russian warships were present in Danish waters.
August 8
The Baltic Fleet staged a new amphibious landing against an undefended coast on August 8, which was larger in organization than previous landing exercises. A naval group was created with what is reported to have been two task forces, one for the actual landing that involved the Ropucha class landing ships and a second task force to provide fire support. Helicopters of the Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation reportedly also took part in the exercise by transporting an air mobile element of naval infantry. The amphibious exercise was monitored by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Nikolai Evmenov.
It appears that this amphibious exercise was the last great exercise held under Ocean Shield 2019 as no other large exercise were reported on this day and August 9. The amount of landing ships was equal to those of August 8, suggesting that the same amount of troops were transported by sea. Todays landing however was complexer as it involved a second group of naval warships providing support and the insertion of additional forces by helicopter. The fact that Admiral Nikolai Evmenov was present to observe this landing might further suggest that todays landing exercise included several maritime tasks which were trained during the previous days. Amphibious landings are also known to be very complex and one of the most difficult military operations to plan an execute. A large scale amphibious assault could indeed be a perfect training to see how well planning and cooperation within the Baltic Fleet has evolved after eight days of exercises.
Also on August 9, British Typhoon aircraft intercepted a group of Russian aircraft near Estonia. The Russian formation was comprised of a Tu-95 bomber aircraft escorted by two Su-27 fighters and conducted a patrol over the Baltic Sea as part of Ocean Shield 2019. No further intercepts were reported.
August 9
No details regarding naval operation or exercises within the framework of Ocean Shield 2019 were reported through OSINT for this day. The absence of exercises on the last day is not surprising and suggests that the warships were probably returning back towards their bases. It is indeed not uncommon, even in NATO exercises, that the last day is used to head back to port and allow the crew to prepare the ships to stand down and slip back into their normal peacetime routine. At the same time, commanding officers are expected to write their final after action reports and attend the lessons identified and learned briefings.
Ocean Shield 2019 summary
Over a course of nine days, the Russian Navy conducted several exercises in the Baltic Sea which encompass the various tasks and skills that are required in a maritime conflict in this region. The exercises that were held can all be linked to four key conditions that the Baltic Fleet will face during a conflict situation.
Detection and destruction of enemy submarines
Russia faces a large submarine threat within the Baltic Region. The navies of Sweden, Poland and Germany all operate diesel-electric submarines that can interdict Russian shipping in the Baltic Region. NATO can further count on D/E submarines from the Netherlands and Norway as an immediate reserve force.
D/E-submarines are very quiet and hard to detect, making them the biggest threat to the Russian Navy. The Baltic Fleet must be able to locate and neutralize these submarines as soon as possible before additional submarines can enter the Baltic Sea. The exercise has show that maritime patrol aircraft from other fleets are needed in order to speed up the process. However, the Baltic Sea presents itself with a different set of environmental parameters compared to those for the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The Baltic Sea has low currents and as an inland sea it is far less saline than the open oceans. Detecting submarines in this different environment requires training and skill, and these were tested at the beginning of Ocean Shield 2019.
Engaging NATOs air assets
NATO has the capability of quickly increasing its air power in the Baltic Region and would thus be able to constantly attack Russian warships. Defeating incoming airstrikes and being able to successfully attack and destroy NATO aircraft is a second key objective which the Baltic Fleet needs to achieve. Should the Baltic Fleet fail in this task, its warships will suffer continuous airstrikes, which could either sink or severely damage the ships to the point they have to retreat back to port. One of the important tactics Russia seeks to develop is the use of its missile boats that can stay hidden near shorelines and attack from an ambush position.
Missile strikes against surface warships
Aside from submarine and air threats, the Baltic Fleet also faces a surface threat as NATO is expected to rush warships into the Baltic Sea in case of a conflict in order to overpower the Russian Navy. The Baltic Fleet must thus be able to defend and destroy enemy surface action groups and if possible gain control over the entrance of the Baltic Sea by interdicting the Danish Straits and the exit of the Kiel canal.
Interdicting these entrances of the Baltic Sea could be done by several means, ranging from landing troops to laying naval mines in the entrances or blocking the entrances by engaging and sinking ships. If Russia fails to control these regions, either directly or indirectly, then NATO maintain the capability of sending in ever more warships into the Baltic Sea and change the maritime balance of power.
Defense of Kaliningrad
Kaliningrad is an exposed enclave and is isolated from the Russian mainland. In the case of a conflict in the Baltic Region, Kaliningrad can find itself quickly under siege from Polish and Lithuanian forces, with additional NATO forces being sent in. Supplying Kaliningrad with new troops and equipment, evacuating the wounded troops and damaged vehicles and safeguarding military installations are paramount in the defense of Kaliningrad. This strategy requires that the Baltic Fleet is able to keep the sea lanes of communication open and is able to conduct the necessary amphibious landings in a warzone with the necessary speed and precision. Unopposed landings could suggest a simple reinforcement of Russian forces at a shoreline which is still under control of Russian forces. Speed will be necessary in order to minimize the time the ships are beached and vulnerable to either artillery fire, missile strikes or air attacks. Landings against a defend coast might suggest landing troops behind NATO lines in order to expand the fighting around Kaliningrad.
The importance of such amphibious landings explains why there were two large landing exercises on August 7 and 8 with the latter one being personally observed by Admiral Nikolai Evmenov.
The exercise involved a wide variety of smaller exercises which will be discussed in further detail below in the form of daily reports followed by a general summary. The first focus of the exercise was to check the combat readiness of the Russian naval forces in the Baltic Sea and the further development of skills in operating the fleet and executing different tasks during this exercise. Several Russian sources state that lessons learned from naval deployments at the Syrian coast were also taken into account during the exercise.
A lot of information regarding the exercise was available in various Russian media outlets, western Media and social media platforms. This amount of information allowed outsiders to keep track of the exercise on a daily basis. Though, even with the abundance of information available in open sources, it is impossible to compile a detailed list of every exercise and ship involved over these nine days. This after action report is composed of the information available through open sources and only includes the exercises on which the Russians decided to report.
August 1
On August 1 the Russian Navy launched Exercise Ocean Shield 2019 in the Baltic Fleet area of operation. The exercise, which would last until August 9, involved a total of 48 warships. This number is a significant increase from the previous exercise Ocean Shield 2018 which took place in the Mediterranean Sea and involved only 26 warships.
A task force of the Northern Fleet, which was previously present at the ceremony for the Russian Navy Day at Saint Petersburg on July 28, also participated in the exercise as it transited through the Baltic Sea. The task force was comprised of the missile cruiser RFS Marshal Ustinov, the destroyer RFS Severodvinsk, the frigate RFS Admiral Gorshkov, the missile submarine RFS Smolensk and their escorting logistical ships.
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| RFS Marshal Ustinov, a Slava class missile cruiser |
The presence of a Northern Fleet task force would be useful in order to increase cooperation between the Northern and Baltic Fleets and one could claim that Ocean Shield 2019 would provide the Northern Fleet with first hand experience and understanding of operating in the Baltic Sea. It was however later reported that the Northern Fleet task force left the Baltic Sea on August 3 and 4. This means that the task force was only transiting through the Baltic Sea and took the opportunity of conducting a small set of exercises but refrained from participating in the whole exercise. The time spent in the Baltic Sea is too short to gain any experience in how naval combat in the Baltic Sea is conducted.
Exercise Ocean Shield 2019 was not only a pure maritime exercise but also involved land based forces. Missile units in the Kaliningrad Region conducted an exercise with Bal and Bastion mobile anti-ship missiles. The exercise included the deployment of these missile systems from their barracks towards a designated firing position. Once in place, these systems then proceeded to simulate the launch their missiles against a group of enemy surface ships. The role of this enemy task force was played by a group of surface warships of the Baltic Fleet. The ships involved in this ‘enemy’ task force were not identified.
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| BAL coastal missile defense system |
August 2
On August 2, several Project 20380 Steregushchy missile corvettes of the Baltic Fleet conducted an anti-submarine drill in the Baltic Sea. The ships involved were identified as the RFS Boikiy, RFS Steregushchiy and RFS Stoiky. The ships were aided in their maneuvers by four Il-38N maritime patrol aircraft of the Northern and Pacific Fleets.
Afterwards, the three corvettes proceeded to take part in a second series of exercises which were centered around joint maneuvering at sea, jamming radar systems, damage control exercises and protection against CBRN weapons.
At the same time, a simulated naval battle between two surface action groups (SAG) took place at the Baltic Sea. The first SAG consisted of the Nanuchka missile corvettes RFS Passat and RFS Liven. The second SAG was designated as the enemy task force and was composed of the Parchim class missile boat RFS Urengoy and the ships Morshansk and R-257. FS Passat and RFS Liven conducted a first missile strike against the enemy SAG. The enemy SAG was then tasked with conducting air-defense drills against the incoming missile strike and afterwards retaliated by launching their own weapons. The whole operation took place with both SAG jamming electronic systems in order to increase their protection against detection and targeting from the opposing forces.
The second day of Ocean Shield 2019 started out with three out of the four Baltic Fleet Project 20380 corvettes taking part in various exercises. As a general rule it is accepted that out of three warships, only one will be available for combat duties at any given time. The second and third ship are either in maintenance or in training or fitting out. With a total of four Steregushchy corvettes it was thus expected that two to three ships would be available for exercise Ocean Shield 2019. With three ships taking part in the exercises, the Baltic Fleet scores well when it comes to having its ships available for duty at sea.
The participation of maritime patrol aircraft in cooperation with surface warships is a common practice in anti-submarine warfare. Aircraft are able to scan large areas faster than surface vessels but are generally less accurate than ship based sensors. Aircraft can deliver the range while surface ships can deliver the precision needed to detect and track potential submarine contacts.
The fact that all four aircraft were drawn from the Northern and Pacific Fleets could indicate that the Baltic Fleet lacked the necessary aircraft needed for this exercise and had to draw upon resources from other fleets. The benefit, however, is that both the Northern and Pacific Fleets gained training and experience in how to operate in the Baltic Region and can now be considered as reserves and backup for the Baltic Fleet in case of a conflict.
August 3
The Oscar-class guided missile submarine RFS Smolensk left the Baltic Sea on August 3. The submarine was part of the Northern Fleet task force that was transiting from Saint Petersburg towards the Barents Sea. Also leaving the Baltic Sea on this day were the sea tug Nikolay Chiker and the logistical support vessel Elbrus. All ships were escorted out by the Danish Navy when the ships passed through Danish waters.
The early departure of the submarine, which past the Fehmarnbelt around 5am local time, suggests that the submarine and the escorting group did not participate much during exercise Ocean Shield 2019 and might have gone straight from Saint Petersburg towards Danish waters in order to leave the Baltic Sea.
It was also reported in German media outlets that Exercise Ocean Shield 2019 was under observation by Sweden and Finland. At the same time, the German Navy dispatched the reconnaissance ship Oste to the Baltic Sea in order to monitor the Russian exercise. The Oste is reported to be equipped with electronics for locating and monitoring radio and radar systems, allowing it to monitor the exercise from a distance. The Oste was last seen on AIS in the Gulf of Finland on July 29 before she turned off her AIS signal. The vessel presumably waited in the Gulf of Finlandto monitor the Russian warships leaving from Saint Petersburg. She was later photographed on August 5 when she was closely monitoring a formation of Russian warships.
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| The Oste, photographed on August 5, can be seen in the background behind the two Ropucha landing ships |
Baltic Fleet naval infantry conducted land exercises at Kaliningrad at battalion level during the day. Over 500 military personnel and 50 military equipment were involved during the exercise. The exercise was reported as a combined arms exercise with a mechanized battalion facing a conventional enemy and involved life firing exercises.
Identified equipement of the exercise included BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 2S3 Akatsiya SPGs, 2K22 Tunguska anti-air defense systems and BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems. Air support for the battalion was provided by the Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation and included Su24 aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters.
In general, August 3 appears to have been a relatively quiet day for Ocean Shield 2019 and no naval exercises were reported through OSINT channels.
August 4
On August 4 the remaining surface vessels of the Northern Fleet left the Baltic Sea by passing under the Storebelt bridge around 1pm local time and entering the North Sea. The task force was comprised of the missile cruiser RFS Marshal Ustinov, the destroyer RFS Severomorsk and the frigate Admiral Gorshkov. Sea tug SB-406 was also part of this flotilla.
The rapid departure of the Northern Fleet task forces from Ocean Shield 2019 can be seen as a missed opportunity for training and gaining experience with the Baltic Fleet. However, from a larger strategic concept, participation of the Northern Fleet in a Baltic Sea exercise could also be deemed unnecessary in the eyes of the Russian high command due to different strategic tasks assigned to each fleet.
These different tasks come from the fact that the Baltic Fleet would always find itself in an isolated position in the case of an armed conflict in the Baltic Sea. NATO control over the Danish Straits make it virtually impossible for any outside Russian fleet to enter the Baltic Sea unopposed and undetected while at the same time, the Baltic Fleet will be unable to break out without risking its destruction by naval and ground forces operating in the Danish Straits. While Russia could gain a first advantage in a surprise attack in the form of outnumbering NATO forces and mining the Danish Straits, the eventual result will always be a continuous flow and build up of NATO forces who arrive through the Danish Straits.
The Northern Fleet will thus be unable to directly support the Baltic Fleet and on the strategic level, the support of the Northern Fleet would either occur in the form of indirect support by attacking Atlantic sea lanes of communications in order to delay and disrupt the arrival of US and NATO forces in the North Sea before they pass into the Baltic Sea.
Training Northern Fleet warships in the specific conditions of naval warfare in the Baltic Sea could thus be judged a waste of time and resources as these ships would never be expected to join the Baltic Fleet directly in a conflict scenario. The first task of the Northern Fleet will most likely involve blue water operations on the Atlantic Ocean while the Baltic Fleet is expected to perform green water naval tasks within the Baltic Sea.
August 5
August 5 has been reported as a very active day during Ocean Shield 2109 as at least 12 ships were reported to have been involved in the various exercises with another unspecified amount of ships providing support. The identified ships are reported to be the three Project 20380 Steregushchiy class corvettes RFS Boikiy, RFS Steregushchiy and RFS Stoiky, Neustrashimyy class frigate RFS Yaroslav Mudry, the missile boats Passat, Geizer, Serpukhov and Mytishchi as well as the missile boats Chuvashia and Morshansk. The two Ropucha class amphibious assault ships RFS Alexander Shabalin and RFS Kaliningrad were also involved.
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| RFS Yaroslav Mudry photographed on August 5 |
The exercises started with a departure from the naval base towards preassigned training grounds. Minesweepers were used to check and clear the harbor entrance and the approaches in order to assure a safe passage of the ships towards their training grounds. Later during the day there was an anti-submarine warfare exercises where the ships simulated detecting and destroying a diesel-electric submarine, a role played by a Kilo class submarine. Gunnery and torpedo exercises were held later during the day, as well as simulated missile strikes. The two amphibious landing ships also practised an amphibious assault against an undefended coast.
The Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation Su-24 bombers and Su-30SM multipurpose fighters staged air-attacks against the naval task force. The attacking aircraft were escorted by Su-27 fighters. A total of ten aircraft were tasked to fly to an assigned region and conduct attacks against a simulated detachment of surface vessels. Reports were made that the ships performed air-defense drills during the day, which might suggest that the aircraft were sent out to perform realistic attacks upon the Baltic Fleet which in turn allowed the Baltic Fleet to conduct a realistic air defense exercise.
Compared to what was reported on previous days, August 5 appears to be a day where Ocean Shield 2019 expanded in scope. More diverse exercises were reported on this day and more ships were involved in these exercises compared to previous days. The exercises also evolved from the level of small task forces to the formation of a larger naval group, which also means an increase in the level of command and coordination. Pictures that were released during the day indeed show a large naval group where the individual ships maneuvered to take up assigned positions within a larger formation.
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| Russian naval group during Ocean Shield 2019 |
August 6
Nanuchka class missile boat RFS Passat conducted an anti-aircraft exercise against a simulated conventional enemy. The corvette was tasked to defend herself against an air attack with the use of her anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as the A-176 naval gun and 30-mm AK-630 close-in weapon systems. The attacking aircraft were Su-24 bombers of the Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation.
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| Nanuchka class missile boat |
Small missile boats such as the Nanuchka class have a tactical advantage when operating in constrained maritime regions such as the Baltic Sea. Their small size reduces their radar cross section and allows them to stay close to shore where their radar signal can be masked in the radar clutter of the shoreline. Missile boats are thus able to strike from an ambush position against ships in open waters. Missile boats, however, also have several weaknesses. They are easily detectable from the air and thus vulnerable against fighter aircraft and helicopters. While missile boats can defend themselves, their small size limits the amount of weapons they can carry with them. These boats are thus best deployed in coastal waters near a naval base so that they can return and rearm once they run out of ammunition.
Logistics personnel of the Baltic Fleet conducted several logistical exercises in the Kaliningrad Region. The exercises ranged from supplying the Kaliningrad naval base, as well as the evacuation of battle damaged vehicles towards specialized maintenance and repair centers. Land units also practiced the construction of pontoon bridges over water obstacles. At sea, these exercises involved resupplying warship with new weapons and ammunition.
August 7
On August 7, Russian media reported that anaval group of three amphibious landing ships practiced air defence drills, followed by the landing of a naval infantry force. The three ships were identified as the Ropucha class landing ships RFS Korolyov, RFS Minsk and RFS Alexander Shabalin.
The first part of the exercise involved defending against aircraft. All three ships used active and passive jamming to avoid being detected and targeted. In a later stage, all three ships were tasked to defend against and repel an air attack by using their AK-176 and AK-725 guns systems.
Later during the day, all three ships practised an amphibious landing of an unidentified unit of Russian naval infantry. During the landing phase, the ships provided support by firing towards enemy positions at the coast with their artillery systems and Grad-M launchers. Even though the size of the naval infantry unit was not reported, a quick assessment of the loading capacity of the Ropucha class shows that three of these ships are capable of landing a battalion sized unit with their tanks and vehicles.
On land, a large anti-terrorism drill was held in the naval base of Kaliningrad. Units were tasked with the defense of repair and logistic facilities against a group of terrorists who approached from under water, in speedboats or over land. Over a thousand military personnel from the Baltic Fleet special forces, naval infantry and military police were involved in the exercise, supported by several aircraft from the Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation.
Most maritime exercises are focused on the pure maritime warfare aspect which also extends to amphibious operations. Ocean Shield 2019 expands this aspect with an exercise that involves terrorist using sea mobility in order to attack shore based installations.
Ocean Shield 2019 thus covers a wider aspect then only the pure maritime conflict. The geography of the Baltic Region, mean that any armed conflict will involve a complex coordination of naval and land based assets. The close proximity of ports mean that terrorists or commando’s could quickly mount hit and run attacks against shore and land installations in the Kaliningrad Region and undermine the sustainability of Russian armed forces in this region.
Also on this day, Russian media reported that over the past days there was a sharp increase of reconnaissance flights conducted by NATO aircraft at the Kaliningrad Region. In addition to a US air force Boeing RC-135U and RQ-4B-30 Global Hawk, a British Sentinel R.1 made two flights on August 6 and 7. Russian media reported that the British aircraft remained close to Kaliningrad but appeared to have been monitoring an unspecified situation at Belarusia, rather than the maritime deployment at Ocean Shield 2019.
At the same time, Danish patrol boats were sent out to monitor Russian warships operating near or even in Danish waters. German media reported that over 19 Russian warships were present in Danish waters.
August 8
The Baltic Fleet staged a new amphibious landing against an undefended coast on August 8, which was larger in organization than previous landing exercises. A naval group was created with what is reported to have been two task forces, one for the actual landing that involved the Ropucha class landing ships and a second task force to provide fire support. Helicopters of the Baltic Fleet Naval Aviation reportedly also took part in the exercise by transporting an air mobile element of naval infantry. The amphibious exercise was monitored by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Nikolai Evmenov.
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| Admiral Nikolai Evmenov |
It appears that this amphibious exercise was the last great exercise held under Ocean Shield 2019 as no other large exercise were reported on this day and August 9. The amount of landing ships was equal to those of August 8, suggesting that the same amount of troops were transported by sea. Todays landing however was complexer as it involved a second group of naval warships providing support and the insertion of additional forces by helicopter. The fact that Admiral Nikolai Evmenov was present to observe this landing might further suggest that todays landing exercise included several maritime tasks which were trained during the previous days. Amphibious landings are also known to be very complex and one of the most difficult military operations to plan an execute. A large scale amphibious assault could indeed be a perfect training to see how well planning and cooperation within the Baltic Fleet has evolved after eight days of exercises.
Also on August 9, British Typhoon aircraft intercepted a group of Russian aircraft near Estonia. The Russian formation was comprised of a Tu-95 bomber aircraft escorted by two Su-27 fighters and conducted a patrol over the Baltic Sea as part of Ocean Shield 2019. No further intercepts were reported.
August 9
No details regarding naval operation or exercises within the framework of Ocean Shield 2019 were reported through OSINT for this day. The absence of exercises on the last day is not surprising and suggests that the warships were probably returning back towards their bases. It is indeed not uncommon, even in NATO exercises, that the last day is used to head back to port and allow the crew to prepare the ships to stand down and slip back into their normal peacetime routine. At the same time, commanding officers are expected to write their final after action reports and attend the lessons identified and learned briefings.
Ocean Shield 2019 summary
Over a course of nine days, the Russian Navy conducted several exercises in the Baltic Sea which encompass the various tasks and skills that are required in a maritime conflict in this region. The exercises that were held can all be linked to four key conditions that the Baltic Fleet will face during a conflict situation.
Detection and destruction of enemy submarines
Russia faces a large submarine threat within the Baltic Region. The navies of Sweden, Poland and Germany all operate diesel-electric submarines that can interdict Russian shipping in the Baltic Region. NATO can further count on D/E submarines from the Netherlands and Norway as an immediate reserve force.
D/E-submarines are very quiet and hard to detect, making them the biggest threat to the Russian Navy. The Baltic Fleet must be able to locate and neutralize these submarines as soon as possible before additional submarines can enter the Baltic Sea. The exercise has show that maritime patrol aircraft from other fleets are needed in order to speed up the process. However, the Baltic Sea presents itself with a different set of environmental parameters compared to those for the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The Baltic Sea has low currents and as an inland sea it is far less saline than the open oceans. Detecting submarines in this different environment requires training and skill, and these were tested at the beginning of Ocean Shield 2019.
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| Swedish Gotland class submarines are build specifically for use in the Baltic Sea |
Engaging NATOs air assets
NATO has the capability of quickly increasing its air power in the Baltic Region and would thus be able to constantly attack Russian warships. Defeating incoming airstrikes and being able to successfully attack and destroy NATO aircraft is a second key objective which the Baltic Fleet needs to achieve. Should the Baltic Fleet fail in this task, its warships will suffer continuous airstrikes, which could either sink or severely damage the ships to the point they have to retreat back to port. One of the important tactics Russia seeks to develop is the use of its missile boats that can stay hidden near shorelines and attack from an ambush position.
Missile strikes against surface warships
Aside from submarine and air threats, the Baltic Fleet also faces a surface threat as NATO is expected to rush warships into the Baltic Sea in case of a conflict in order to overpower the Russian Navy. The Baltic Fleet must thus be able to defend and destroy enemy surface action groups and if possible gain control over the entrance of the Baltic Sea by interdicting the Danish Straits and the exit of the Kiel canal.
Interdicting these entrances of the Baltic Sea could be done by several means, ranging from landing troops to laying naval mines in the entrances or blocking the entrances by engaging and sinking ships. If Russia fails to control these regions, either directly or indirectly, then NATO maintain the capability of sending in ever more warships into the Baltic Sea and change the maritime balance of power.
Defense of Kaliningrad
Kaliningrad is an exposed enclave and is isolated from the Russian mainland. In the case of a conflict in the Baltic Region, Kaliningrad can find itself quickly under siege from Polish and Lithuanian forces, with additional NATO forces being sent in. Supplying Kaliningrad with new troops and equipment, evacuating the wounded troops and damaged vehicles and safeguarding military installations are paramount in the defense of Kaliningrad. This strategy requires that the Baltic Fleet is able to keep the sea lanes of communication open and is able to conduct the necessary amphibious landings in a warzone with the necessary speed and precision. Unopposed landings could suggest a simple reinforcement of Russian forces at a shoreline which is still under control of Russian forces. Speed will be necessary in order to minimize the time the ships are beached and vulnerable to either artillery fire, missile strikes or air attacks. Landings against a defend coast might suggest landing troops behind NATO lines in order to expand the fighting around Kaliningrad.
The importance of such amphibious landings explains why there were two large landing exercises on August 7 and 8 with the latter one being personally observed by Admiral Nikolai Evmenov.
