Russia's newest minehunters in perspective

Russia recently announced that it also seeks to modernize its mine countermeasure (MCM) fleet which resulted in a shipbuilding plan for around 40 new minesweepers to join the Russian fleets by 2030. This new shipbuilding program will result in a further modernization and  increase in efficiency with regard to Russian MCM operations, it will not result in a closing of the capability gap that currently exists compared to western naval forces.

Russian media outlets stressed the fact that the new minesweepers will be constructed with a plastic hull instead of regular hulls which are typically made of steel or wood. While Russian sources were quick to report on this they did not mentioned that the shift towards plastic hulls is done due to its bigger advantages while conducting MCM operations. Due to their plastic hulls, the new Russian minesweepers will be able to reduce their magnetic signature, making them less detectable by magnetic mines. The decision to use these new hulls is not something new and several minehunters and minesweepers used by western countries are already constructed with these hulls and have proven themselves to have a safer track record when conducting MCM operations. The Russian Navy as such is reacting and adopting around proven concepts when it comes to conduct MCM operations in a safer and more efficient way. The use of plastic hulls is as such a step in a good direction if one looks at construction of new MCM vessels. However on the operational level and with regards to doctrine, the Russian Navy still lags behind proven operational concepts made by western MCM forces.

A major shift made by western naval forces with regard to MCM operations is the change from sweeping mines towards hunting mines. Sweeping minefields involves a vessel or helicopter dragging a demining installation into a minefield. This kind of operation can create a safe corridor in a minefield at a fast pace but it involves several risks for the vessel conducting the operation. As the vessel is expected to pass into the minefield before the demining installation it drags can pass, there is a risk that sea mines can be detonated by the minesweeper and damage or sink the craft.

Future MCM operations will involve unmanned systems scanning and entering the minefields

Minehunting reduces these risks as the vessel is expected to operate from the edge of the minefield and uses its bow mounted sonar in order to detect the mines in front of it. Once a mine is detected, UAVs or divers are sent out to place explosives against the mine and have it detonated once the divers, UAV and ship are placed at a safe distance. Minehunting thus reduces the risk to the vessel but it is inherently slower compared to minesweeping.

Conclusions
Russia appears to continue to operate minesweepers instead of shifting to minehunters in order to conduct MCM operations. There are several factors that could explain why the Russian Navy opts for this more dangerous method of clearing minefields. One could be its operational doctrine that might call for corridors to be opened in minefields in the fasted possible timeframe and with the risk of acceptable losses. As such, minesweepers would be a good choice and shifting towards plastic hulls would be one way Russia seeks to increase the survivability of its MCM fleet during such operations.

A second factor could be that Russia lacks the means to produce or acquire the technology needed to build and operate minehunters. Russia is capable of building bow mounted sonars but currently build them in order to detect submarines. Detecting smaller objects which are mostly placed on the seabed and are made from metal or plastics requires a different kind of sonar. At the same time, there is the need to visualize the sonar image in a high enough resolution in order to detect mine-like objects on the seabed.

It is also unknown at this point if the new minesweepers will be build according to an open design that allows room in the future to convert them into minehunters. Such an open design would allow Russian MCM forces to be upgraded in the future to new standards without the need to build new ships. This is especially imported with regard to the new methods currently developed in the field of MCM operations. These new methods will see a ship acting as a base platform for several UAVs which can be used to search and dismantle seamines and thus negates the need for ships to operate in or at the edges of a minefield. Russia however is not developing any of these UAVs needed to make this concept work, making the need for an open design more important if Russia seeks to clase this capability gap between its navy and western navies.

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