Baltic Fleet training for amphibious landings - April 2020
On
April 20 and 21, Naval Infantry units of the Baltic Fleet conducted a large
scale amphibious exercise in the Kaliningrad Oblast as part of a scheduled two-day
exercise. The exercise involved embarkation, transit and landing against a defended
coast. The exercise started on April 20 at the port of Baltiysk in
the Kaliningrad Oblast where 20 BTR-82A Infantry Fighting Vehicles were loaded
on board of several amphibious warships. The amphibious warships were
identified as the Ropucha class LSTs RFS Kaliningrad and RFS Korolev, supported
by the Zubr class hovercraft RFS Eugene Koreshov. At least two Dyugon class
landing craft were also seen taking part in the exercise.
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| BTR-82 being loaded on board of the Ropucha class LSTs |
The
fast loading of the Ropucha class LSTs was made possible due to the fact that
these vessels were moored in the Mediterranean way, meaning stern towards the
land and the bow pointed to the open sea. Not only allows this way of mooring
an easy and fast departure towards open sea, it also allows the BTR-82A’s to simply
drive inside the ship via the stern ramp
in the same order as they are to disembark through the bow doors.
Once
loaded, the vessels left port and were then escorted by a naval surface action
croup comprised of several surface vessels. The vessels were reported to be corvettes,
small missile ships and boats and small anti-submarine ships but no specific
names were reported. Aircraft and helicopters of the Baltic Fleet Naval
Aviation provided air support during the transit towards the landing area. In
total, 10 ships, aircraft and helicopters took part in the transit phase.
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| The amphibious task force underway - visible are two Dyugon lancing craft, a Ropucha class LST, the Eugene Koreshov hovercraft and what appears to be a Steregushchiy class corvette |
Once
the landing area was approached on April 21, a group of mine-sweepers were send
forwards with the amphibious landing ships as they approached the enemy
occupied beach. The use of mine-sweepers can be interpreted in two ways. First,
there is still a large threat of unexploded bombs and sea mines in the Baltic
Sea, the result of two world wars as well as the Cold War where sea mines were
used in large quantities. Secondly, it is expected that enemy forces will
defend their beach in all possible ways, including the use of sea mines in an
attempt to hit amphibious warships approaching the beach. As such, capable
demining skills and experience are needed during an amphibious landing. At the
same time, the amphibious landing ships trained in defending against an enemy
air and surface attack. The vessels reportedly employed active and passive
electronic counter measures to disrupt the enemy attacks. In a second part of
this exercise, the landing ships engaged the aerial and sea targets with their
close in weapon systems and naval artillery guns respectively.
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| Su-30SM fighter aircraft |
Air
support prior to the actual landing phase was provided by Su-30SM aircraft and
Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters. These aircraft attacked enemy positions in order
to soften them up and weaken the enemy resistance. The airstrikes were
supplemented by an artillery bombardment conducted by the escorting naval surface
group. Ship-borne Ka-27PS helicopter then proceeded to land engineer units on
the beach. The engineers were tasked with creating safe corridors through a
minefield located on the beach. Once these corridors were in place, the LSTs
approached the beach and landed the BTRs who could then safely exit the beach
through the marked corridors.
The
exercise was further supplemented by an parachute landing behind the enemy
positions. This part of the exercise was conducted by the air-assault battalion
of the Baltic Fleet Naval Infantry. The size of the unit involved in the
parachute drop was however not reported. While the landing phase was taking
place, the surface action group conducted their own drills in the naval ranges.
The warships practiced anti-submarine warfare and air-defense drills.
Conclusions
The
exercise conducted by the Baltic Fleet is a realistic assessment of the kind of
operations that will occur during wartime. The exercise not only allowed the
training of embarkation, transit and landing, it also allowed training for
every possible aspect that can occur during an amphibious landing. Not only was
the landing undertaken against a defended beach, it was also conducted in an environment
where the enemy was aware of the landing force approaching the beach and who
decided to break up the attack with its own surface, subsurface and air assets.
This forced the Russian forces to defend against incoming attacks before the
ships could actually start the landing.
Aside
from the defending actions undertaken on the way towards the landing zone, the
Russians also practiced their amphibious doctrine and practiced a specific
sequence of events of which they think is the way to successfully and rapidly
take a defended beach. The sequence as demonstrated in this exercise involves
an airstrike and naval bombardment to weaken and suppress enemy positions. This
in turn allowed helicopters to land on the beach and drop of engineers who are
then tasked to clear beach obstacles. During this exercise, the engineers had
to create corridors through a minefield. Once these corridors were in place,
the LSTs approached the beach and landed the BTRs who could then safely exit
the beach. To prevent enemy reinforcements from arriving and strengthening the defense,
an air assault was conducted to isolate the beachhead.
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| BTR-82As leaving a Ropuch class LST during the actual landing phase |
One
should take in account that amphibious landing exercises in the Baltic Region
are tied to the larger strategic situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast. Amphibious
assaults could be undertaken to directly attack NATO forces besieging Kaliningrad.
This would be in line with the traditional use of naval infantry where they
serve as a specialized force to establish a beachhead. Army units are then
transported towards the beachhead for the breakout and attack against targets
deeper inland.
However,
this task force, comprised of 20 BTR-82As, can also serve as a scouting or
raiding force that can operate further away from Kaliningrad in an effort to
force NATO to spread its forces over a large littoral zone, defending several
possible landing zones. The raiding force can thus create virtual attrition on
the NATO forces besieging Kaliningrad.
The
small surface action group could, at least in theory, temporary establish sea control
for a limited period. This would allow the naval infantry to conduct their
landing and raiding operations, followed be re-embarkation and retreating before
a coordinated assault against the Russian forces can be organized.
Sources
