Russia's naval priorities exposed?

Construction of the Project 636.3 Improved Kilo class diesel-electric submarines continues at a steady pace. Following the construction of a batch of six submarines for the Black Sea Fleet, Russian news outlets reported that a second batch of submarines was starting construction. At least four new submarines were mentioned by the media with the first two submarines, the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and Volkhov, destined for the Russian Pacific Fleet.

Type 636.3 submarine

The construction of these submarines, currently the most modern in diesel-electric submarines in the Russian Navy, offers us a small albeit incomplete insight in the naval modernization plans and priorities of the Russian Navy. The current state of the Russian Navy is slowly changing from an outdated fleet in decline to a modern green water navy capable of projecting military power in the near seas. Russia's naval modernization is currently ongoing and a lot of ships are in need of replacement in order to stop the decline of naval power. Without a priority in its five fleets we would expect Russia to distribute its new submarines more evenly in order to remain strong at all points. We see however that Russia has decided to focus its naval modernization primary to its Black Sea Fleet and it appears that the Pacific Fleet will be the next fleet on the priority list.

Priority of the Black Sea Fleet

The Black Sea is currently described as a Russian lake with Russia deploying the most naval and aviation assets in this region. It also has several maritime strong points in this region such as the naval bases at Novorossiysk and Sevastopol from which Russian naval assets can project power across the Black Sea. Unlike the other fleets, all ports within the Black Sea are free of ice during the winter, allowing trade to be conducted all year long without restrictions. Access to the Bosporus allows Russian merchant ships to link up with the global maritime trading routes while Russian warships can project power in the waters around the Middle East. Of the current NATO members, only Turkey has a naval fleet program in place to challenge the Russian Black Sea Fleet but Turkey has its geopolitical interests focused on the Mediterranean and Red Sea.

Novorossiysk Port

The priority of the Black Sea is important. The unrestricted maritime trade could help in the economic development of Southern Russia, possibly resulting in a further political stabilization of the Caucasus region. At the same time, the Black Sea is Russia's southern flank against NATO and thus the fleet mus be able to project power into the neighboring NATO countries while preventing maritime forces from entering into the Black Sea through the Bosporus.

Finally, the Black Sea Fleet is closest to the Russian allies in the Middle East and allows Russia to project its power into the region. The ships of the Black Sea currently deliver the backbone of a permanent task force in the eastern Mediterranean which is capable of supporting the Assad regime in Syria with accurate cruise missile strikes. At the same time the amphibious warships of the Black Sea Fleet deliver vital military aid to Syria in order to support the Syrian Arab Army. This deployment has been dubbed the Syrian express due to the regular transits made by these amphibious warships.

The fact that most modern warships of the Russian Navy, including the whole first batch of the project 636.3 submarines, are assigned to the Black Sea Fleet are an indication that this fleet is the first priority of the Russian Navy.

Emergence of the Pacific Fleet

Geopolitical events within the Pacific Region are forcing Russia to rethink its current military position within this region. The emergence of the Chinese Navy as a potential global maritime power by the 2025-2030 timeframe have set in motion a series of events which Russia can not ignore. First, the build of Chinese maritime power, both in numbers and quality, has created an naval arms race within the Pacific Region. As a result, Japan, South-Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and Australia, are all modernizing and expanding their navies.

China currently expands its influence towards the First Island Chain

Secondly, the expansion of the Chinese Navy has forced the United States to shift its military assets away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific. The stated end goal is to have 60% of the US Navy deployed in the Pacific Region compared to the 40% at the start of the century.

Russia is thus risking of becoming a secondary naval power within the Pacific Region if it does not act to either modernize or expand its naval forces within the Pacific Region. Failure to do so could entail Russia being overshadowed by its Pacific neighbors such as Japan and South Korea. It is however impossible for Russia to match the construction speeds of China, the United States and Japan so it can not expect to match these countries in numbers. Russia can however become a relative strong and modern naval power that has a credible deterrent within the Pacific Region. A strong Pacific Fleet can translate itself to the necessary political power in order to influence the geopolitical decisions within this region.

A modern Pacific Fleet also serves Russia well in maintaining its military balance with China. Though Russia can not outnumber the Chinese Navy, it can bring enough naval firepower into its military alliance in order to remain an equal partner. At the same time the Russian Pacific Fleet could act as a deterrent, preventing Japan and South Korea to focus entirely against China.

Conclusion

Though the progress of a single ship building program is insufficient to base any credible long term predictions regarding the build up of Russia's maritime forces, it allows us to get some understanding on how Russia view the world and where it seeks to focus its maritime power. The deployment of key systems, such as modern diesel-electric submarines, could be one of these glimpses we have to understand Russia's plans. The fact that all six submarines of the first batch went to the Black Sea Fleet was a strong indication that Russia seeks to gain maritime strength in one key region first instead of gaining strength in all its maritime regions.

At the same time, the geopolitical dynamics of the Black Sea and Pacific Region dictate their own importance upon the Russian State. So too does the Baltic Region but here we notice a remainder of the status quo while modern diesel-electric submarines are a powerful weapon in these weapons, as seen in recent years. Yet we currently do not see the strong build up as we saw in the Black Sea and as we are now expected to see in the Pacific Region. Though these deductions are currently indirect they are too important to ignore as they shape our perspective. Future developments of the Russian maritime forces will either reinforce this perspective or reshape it and make it more accurate.