Russian presence in the North Sea

Over the past years there have been sporadic and mostly symbolic deployments of Russian surface warships in the North Sea. These deployments project a limited amount of military power into a NATO controlled environment and thus pose a limited military threat to its alliance members. Instead, these deployments rather serve a symbolic purpose, as to remind NATO and the world that Russia has the capabilities to project power into the North Sea and into Europe. These deployments first serve to maintain a certain status quo and a balance against NATO deployments in the Baltic Sea where Russia seeks to maintain a position of strength. They also serve a certain propaganda purpose as these deployments are often noticed by and mentioned in Western news bulletins who usually give the appearance that NATO forces were captured by surprise and are thus vulnerable.

For NATO however, these sporadic Russian deployments in the North Sea can serve as an opportunity to counter Russia's influence either by clear communication about NATO's reactions to these Russian surface task forces or by timely creating its own task forces to shadow and escort the Russian warships as they operate in the North Sea. Both actions combined could be used to create an image of NATO maritime forces that are prepared, ready and capable to react against Russian maritime deployments in the North Sea.

Recent maritime activity

The Russian maritime activity in recent years consisted to the following deployments:

• June 2017: Two of the four Steregushchy class corvettes from the Baltic Fleet trained into the North Sea for six days.
• June 2018: Two Steregushchy class corvettes and units of the naval infantry brigade from Kaliningrad entered the North Sea.  During a seven-day period they conducted replenishment-at-sea, air defense, surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare exercises before returning to the Baltic Sea.
• June-July 2019: Two Steregushchy class corvettes from the Baltic Fleet operated on the North Sea for nine days, this time proceeding as far as the Norwegian Sea and conducting multiple exercises.
• February 2020: One Steregushchiy class corvette accompanied by a landing ship entered the North Sea.  Unlike the previous deployments, additional ships rotated out to the North Sea on a staggered basis until all four of the Baltic Fleet’s Steregushchy class corvettes, and all three of Russia’s Ropucha class landing ships had rotated through the deployment. At one point, the Royal Navy reported seven Russian Navy ships, including support and spy ships, accompanying this group.  All told, the Baltic Fleet maintained a continuous presence in the North Sea for at least 36 days, culminating in a SS-N-25 exercise over 10-13 March 2020.
  
• August 2020: As part of Operation Ocean Shield 2020, two surface action groups were formed in the North Sea in order to exercise the launch of cruise missiles against surface and land targets. The vessels that took part in this exercise were reported as the frigates RFS Steregushchy, RFS Boikiy and RFS Stoikiy as well as Karakurt class corvettes RFS Mytishchi and RFS Sovetsk and the Buyan-M class corvette RFS Serpukhov though the exact composition of each task force was not reported.
  The missile exercise involved simulated and simultaneous launches of Kalibr and Uran missiles against simulated targets, both on land as at sea. According to Russian Media, all targets were hit during the exercise. The ships also practiced electronic warfare during the exercise by jamming electronic systems and sensors. Once the missile exercise was completed, the ships completed a further program focused on damage control, anti-sabotage defense, communication between ships and joint navigation.
• October 2020: Russia's Baltic Fleet responded against the creating of the United Kingdoms carrier task force by conducting anti-surface missile drills in the North Sea. Steregushchy class corvettes RFS Steregushchy and RFS Stoikiy carried out simulated missile strikes against a simulated carrier task force from an unknown position in the North Sea. Both corvettes launched Uran anti-ship missiles during this drill. According to Russian sources, both corvettes succeeded in hitting their targets. Both ships also used electronic jamming during the missile strike. Following the missile drill, both corvettes held additional drills such as joint navigation, ship-to-ship communication, damage control and defending against sabotage.

Most deployments are solely conducted by the Baltic Fleet during the summer months but never on a permanent basis and only for a limited duration of several days, the notable exception being the deployment in February and March 2020. Most deployments are during the summer months when Russian warships are engaged in their summer training period. The winter months are usually reserved for repairs and preparing the fleet to be ready for the coming summer months.

Russia's military capabilities in the North Sea

Deploying warships of the Baltic Fleet in the North Sea serves only a limited military purpose which will always end up disastrously for the Russian Navy. All nations bordering the North Sea are members of NATO and all of them have sufficient maritime capabilities to meet and exceed those of the Russians. While Russian forces are able to enter the North Sea during peace time, their changes of returning back to base during wartime are very slim to almost non existent. This is especially true for the Baltic Fleet which needs to pass through the Danish Strait which is under the control of NATO forces.

Russia is well aware of this fact and sending out Baltic Fleet warships in the North Sea serves little military purpose unless a surprise first strike is desired. Kalibr armed warships operating in the North Sea are able to strike key infrastructure in the whole of Europe such as HQs, airfields, military bases, power plants, etc. They could also attack capital warships forming up in or near the North Sea, such as for example the British carrier strike group.

Kalibr range when launched from the North Sea - Source: Marineschepen.nl

One could reason that a forward deployment of the Baltic Fleet in the North Sea could serve as a virtual attrition of NATO forces and delay the arrival of NATO maritime reinforcements into the Baltic Sea. However, once the shooting starts, it is not a question if the Russian forces can return back to their bases but how long they can survive in a NATO dominated maritime environment. The loss of these surface warships in the North Sea would only weaken Russia's maritime presence in the Baltic Sea where the isolated Kaliningrad Region depends on maritime supply.

Symbolic and political deployments

It is therefore more reasonable to assume that Russian maritime deployments in the North Sea are more symbolic in nature and serve a political agenda, rather then a military one. Russia is well aware of the vulnerability of its warships in the North Sea in the case of a hypothetical conflict. The maritime deployments rather serve to maintain a status quo with NATO. Just as NATO warships project power in the Baltic Sea, a region Russia seeks to control, Russian warships in the North Sea project military capabilities in Western Europe as a counterbalance.

Russia also benefits from Western media reporting on these deployments. Often, these news bulletins report as if Russia has caught NATO forces by surprise and are has temporary the upper hand in the North Sea. Messages like these usually fail to report on NATO's maritime dominance in the North Sea and convey a message of Russian strength. NATO so far has been unable to correct this narrative even though it always has forces escorting and tracking the Russians as they operate in the North Sea.

Opportunities for NATO

The current way in which these Russian maritime deployments are reported can be an opportunity for NATO in several ways. While most reports are alarmist and speak about surprise and Russian maritime strength, they can be used to justify the need for sufficient and well equipped naval forces for operations in the North Sea. This is important as most Western European NATO members have been decreasing their armed forces over the past decades. The perception of Russian maritime strength and strike capabilities could serve as a catalyst for more investment in the various navies operating in the North Sea.

A second side effect is that Western media highlight the Russian strike capabilities both to the broad public and the decisionmakers on the military and political level. As such, it prevents that desensitization can take place. This in turn makes it less likely that a first strike by the Russian Navy can come as a surprise, thus reducing the chances of a first strike being successful. 

NATO forces can also try to actively take control of the narrative by forming ad hoc surface task forces to intercept and escort Russian task forces as they transit and train in the North Sea. Given the fact that the Baltic Fleet needs to pass the Danish Strait in order to reach the North Sea, NATO forces have time to detect and track these task forces and start their response in time. If this is properly communicated in the Western media, it will create a message of NATO being a capable, prepared and ready organization that can respond to military challenges in time.